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In his insightful paper Pineau offers very interesting suggestions for analyzing
fallacies from a Toulminian perspective. Pineau tries to connect the three broad
categories of fallacies in Johnson and Blair’s taxonomy with the specific parts of the
Toulmin model. His intention is to move closer - as he puts it - toward a clear and
accurate account of fallacies on the Toulmin model. Generally speaking, Pineau
succeeds in doing so.
When it comes to fallacies of irrelevant reason, we not only have to look at
the warrant but also to the backing. As Pineau shows, the backing is decisive. The
source of the error in fallacies of hasty conclusion is located in the qualifier or in the
lack of the qualifier. Fallacies of problematic premise should be located in the data
or in the data and the claim taken together.
The fallacy of irrelevant reason occurs when the premises put forth to
establish a conclusion are irrelevant to that conclusion. In Toulmin’s terms this
amounts to the irrelevance of the data to the claim. According to Pineau, when
analyzing fallacies of irrelevant reason, the source of the problem will not be data
itself, but rather the warrant. Pineau then points to the fact that the warrant
normally is not explicitly stated and must therefore be reconstructed. Since the
warrant is given its authority by a backing we can take it that none of the warrants
that can be seen as candidates for reconstruction, have a backing, if the warrant
really is defective. Without any backed warrant there can be no relevance between
the data and the claim. Hence the source of the irrelevance is the lack of backing.
Following Toulmin’s general assumptions this seems to be a logical consequence.
However, some questions remain. What are we supposed to do when no
backing is provided? In some cases, no backing is necessary because the warrant is
obviously acceptable. In other cases the backing may not be explicitly stated. The
question is: Is lack of a backing always a reason to conclude that the arguer is guilty
of a fallacy of irrelevant reason? And what if there is an explicit backing, but this
proves to be defective, for instance because the information that is mentioned in the
backing is not accurate? Do we still have a fallacy of irrelevance in case the backing
is inadequate?
According to Pineau, the argument “(D1) John has been divorced three times
so (C1) we should not believe anything John says” is fallacious “not only because
none of the potential warrants that could be used to move from the data to the claim
have a backing, but also because it is assumed to have a backed warrant to authorize
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the step from (D1) to (C1).” It is not entirely clear what Pineau means when he says
that a warrant has no backing. Is it the actual lack of an explicit backing or is it the
lack of a possible (conceivable) backing. If the latter is meant, the question is, how
do we determine whether a backing is – in principle – conceivable?
Another problem I encountered has to do with the example of the
argumentum ad hominem, which is seen as fallacy of irrelevance. I wonder whether
the Toulmin model, which is focused on the inferential relation between a premise
and a conclusion, or the data and the claim, is suitable for analyzing fallacies of this
kind. According to Pineau, a personal attack is non-fallacious in case the warrant is
backed. A personal attack is fallacious when the warrant is not backed. This
criterion offers in my view no sufficient criteria for the determining whether an
arguer commits the fallacy of ad hominem.
In this view the arguer commits an ad hominem in case the personal attack is
not sustained by sound argumentation. A personal attack is reasonable when the
argumentation provided is sound. But, what if an arguer in a discussion about a
certain subject is attacked by an opponent who claims the arguer is not an expert in
the field the claim is about, because the arguer for instance does not have a
university degree? The information that the arguer does not have such a degree may
be relevant to the claim. Still, the attack cannot be seen as a legitimate move if the
opponent did not rely on his expertise or reliability, but is simply putting forward
argumentation. Instead, such a personal attack would only be a legitimate move
when the arguer in fact claimed that he is an expert when obviously he is not. In this
case, however, the attack should be considered a reasonable reaction to an ad
verecundiam fallacy. In other words, it is possible to have a personal attack with a
properly backed warrant that still should be considered an argumentum ad
hominem. It all depends on the specific place in the interaction the personal attack
takes place. These kinds of factors should be taken into account for a full analysis of
the argumentum ad hominem. The Toulmin model does not provide the means for
such an analysis because of its restricted scope. Problems like these seem to require
a dialectical perspective.
I also have a question regarding the fallacies of problematic premise. As an
example Pineau mentions begging the question. He follows Johnson and Blair when
he defines this fallacy as an argument where either the premises contain the
conclusion or the premises are acceptable only if the conclusion has already been
accepted. The claim is contained in the data or the datum is only acceptable if the
claim has already been accepted. Pineau concludes that with begging the question,
we must not only focus on the data of an argument, but on the claim as well. This is
not the case in his first example of problematic premise, in which the data is left
undefended or under-defended. In this case we clearly have to focus on the data
alone. This makes one wonder why begging the question is subsumed under the
heading of problematic premise, especially because in his first example about the
evolution theory the error is in the data exclusively. If we follow Pineau’s line of
reasoning we have to conclude that we are dealing with two rather different types of
fallacies since in each of the three categories of fallacies we are advised to look at
one specific element of the Toulmin layout.
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In spite of these problems, in his paper Pineau points at a very interesting
way of classifying and analyzing fallacies using the Toulmin model. A way which
seems to offer opportunities for more research.
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